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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS -

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -

RES JUDICATA

H was employed by the M company in Louisiana as a laborer in connection
with the drilling of oil wells. In the course of his employment, H while working
in Texas was injured. He sought and procur'ed in Texas an award of compensation under its Workmen's Compensation Law, and the company's insurer made
payments of compensation as required by the statute and the award. Later H
brought an action under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law to recover
additionally the difference between the amount allowed in Texas and the amount
allowed in Louisiana. M company contended that any recovery was barred under
rules of res judicata by the Texas award which it alleged was entitled to full faith
and credit in Louisiana. By a vote of five to four the Court Held, - The Texas
award was entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Louisiana. The minority of the court said that the matter was not res judicata because the Texas suit
had been brought against an insurer and therefore the parties in the Louisiana
action were different. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 64 Sup. Ct. 208 (1944).
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In approaching this problem the Court followed the analogy to the ordinary conflict rule in tort cases and held that the law of the place of injury rather
than of the place of contracting governed in the absence of express language
in the statute of the place of contracting for recovery outside the state. Cf. In
re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 NE 693. This earlier view had subsequently given
way to what might be called the "contract" theory. Under this view, it has been
held that there may be recovery under the act in force in the state in which the
workmen entered the employer's service, even though the injury took place elsewhere. Industrial Commission v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 64 Colo. 480, 174 Pac.
589; Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Price, 300 SW 667 (Texas). Thus before
1932 it may be said that the rule was that where a contract of employment was
entered into in one state and the employee was injured in another state, the employee could seek a remedy under either or both of the Workmen's Compensation
Acts. Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, Sec. 97, p. 245.
In 1932, the first constitutional limitation was imposed on the forum by a
holding that where the contract of employment was subject to a state statute making its remedies exclusive to all contracts of employment entered into in that
state, the forum was bound to give full faith and credit to that statute even though
injury took place in another state. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 US
145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 76 I. Ed. 1026. Later in the case of Alaska Packers Assn.
v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California, 294 US 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518, 79 L.
Ed. 1044, it was held that the social interest of the state of employment was
greater than that of the place of injury under the circumstances presented, but the
case did not state whether the place of injury would have been compelled to give
full faith and credit to the statute of the place of employment. However in
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 306 US 493, 83 L. Ed.
940, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, it was held that the place of injury does not have to substitute for its own statute the conflicting statute of another state even though
that statute would have been of controlling force in the courts of that state, with
respect to the same person and events.
Such being the background with respect to where compensation may be had,
what is the effect of an award, under one of the statutes applicable, upon a claim
in a second state for additional compensation? The majority of the state courts
have taken the position that recovery may be hid in the second state, although the
recovery would be only the difference by which the award of the second state exceeds that of the first. McLaughlin's Case. 274 Mass. 217, 174 NE 338;
Salvation Army v. Industrial Comm., 219 Wis. 343, 263 NW 349, 101 ALR
1440. The theory of most of the courts has becn that the first award is not res
jildicata in a proceeding in another state since it is based upon a compensation
act different from the one upon which the new proceedings are grounded. Se
Salvation Army v. Ind. Comm., supra. In New York many of the cases have pro-
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ceeded on the theory that the award of the place of injury will not be recognized
as that court did not have jurisdiction of the cause in the first instance. Gilbert v.
Des Laurier Column Mould Co., 167 NYS 274, 180 App. Div. 59; Anderson v.
Jarrelt Chambers Co., 210 App. Div. 543, 206 NYS 458.
However there have been several state cases in which additional recovery in
the second state has been denied. In Hughes v. Ware, 34 NM 29, 276 Pac. 27,
the court held that a second award would not be permitted as the employer had
already borne the cost imposed on him by law. In De Gray v. Miller Bros. Const.
Co., 173 A. 556, the court denied the second recovery on the grounds of estoppel.
To the same effect see Minto v. Hitching and Co., 198 NYS 610, 204 App. Div. 6.
In the instant case the Supreme Court has followed the latter position but
has rested its decision on the grounds of the full faith and credit clause. The
principal case cited for the position taken is that of Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v.
Schendel, 270 US 611. ,46 S. Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 757, where it was held that a prior
determination under a state compensation act that claiment was engaged in intrastate commerce was res judicata in proceedings under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. The court iterated the distinction between the full faith and credit
required to be given judgments and that to which local common and statutory law
is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In the case of
local law, the state need not subordinate its law to that of another, but in the case
of judgments such subordination may be the case.
It seems that the conclusion of the majority is hard to accept when viewed
from the basis of the Schendel case. As pointed out by Justice Black in his dissent
the statutes involved in that case were exclusive of each other and not conflicting
as in the instant case. However as to the second point made by the court, the
distinction between the full faith and credit given to judgments and that to local
statutes and common law seems to be well established and was recognized as recently as Williams v. North Carolina, 317 US at 294-6, 63 S. Ct. at 211-2. The
only controversy on this point lies in determining whether to view the award
as a judgment, entitled as such to full faith and credit, because the same injury
affords the basis of both proceedings although the parties were different. The
distinction drawn by the minority seems to be merely a technical one as in reality,
the insurer is going to pay in either instance.
The effect of this decision certainly will not cause employers to become
bankrupt or throw the burden of care of injured employees on the general public.
It perhaps will cause many employees to examine carefully the statutes of the
states that may take jurisdiction before electing which one they desire to invoke.
Certainly the position of the majority finds much favor insofar as it limits the
number of litigations that an employer may have to face for a single injury.
JOHN

J.

SCHATT.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

NEGLIGENCE -

WANTON

MISCONDUCT OF DEFENDANT AS PRECLUDING

DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; LAST CLEAR

CHANCE

DOCTRINE; DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

In an action of trespass for wrongful death caused by the negligence of a

streetcar motorman, the trial judge gave binding instructions for defendant because
of decedent's contributory negligence. The court in banc refused a new trial.
Held, that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that decedent's contributory negligence would bar a recovery even if the motorman was grossly
negligent, but such contributory negligence would not constitute a bar if the
motorman was guilty of wanton misconduct. Kasanovich, Admrx., v. George et
al., Trustees, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (1943).'

The general rule is, of course, that contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff is a bar to recovery based on the defendant's negligence. This rule
flows from the principle that when the litigating parties are in pari delicto the
law refuses its aid to either and the court leaves them in the situation in which
their cooperating negligence has placed them.2 It is interesting to note that in
defining negligence and contributory negligence the cases do not ordinarily draw
any distinction. However, the Pennsylvania court early adopted what it considered
a safe rule and held that if the negligence of the plaintiff contributed in "any"
degree to the injury, even though not to such an extent as to be considered a
"legal" cause, he cannot recover. In a more recent case it was said that in order
to constitute contributory negligence which defeats a recovery in an action based
upon the negligence of another, the injured person's negligence must have been
a "juridical cause" of the injury, and not simply a condition of its occurrence.3
While the courts, in modern decisions, have refused to recognize "degrees"
of negligence, a distinction is commonly made between "mere negligence" and
what is frequently called "reckless and wanton misconduct." Through the recognition of this distinction, the majority rule is settled: -

where the defendant has

been guilty of wanton or willful misconduct the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff does not bar a recovery. This is the view adopted by the American Law
Institute and is the view expressed in dicta by the Pennsylvania courts in previous
,See
also MISORSKI V. PENNSYLVANIA RY., 348 Pa. 204, 34 A. (2d) 526 (1943).
2
Professor Bohlen, in 21 Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1908), points out that there are three theories
advanced as to the basis of the defense of contributory negligence. These are: (1) proximate causa.
tion, (2) indemnity or contribution between joint tortfeasors, and (3) voluntary assumption of
risk. The author also says: "All attempts to ascertain upon what legal principle the defense is based
are ex posl facto, to explain and account for a result already reached apparently unconsciously."
See also
SMONONGAHELA CITY V. FISCHER, 111 Pa. 9, 2 At. 87, 56 Am. Rep. 241 (1886).
RoBINSON V. AMERICAN ICE Co., 229 Pa. 366, 141 At. 244 (1928), where the court said: "The
test for contributory negligence is whether the act constituting the negligence contributed in any
degree to the production of the injury." McFAtDEN V. PENZOIL Co., 341 Pa. 433 (1941) remble.
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decisions. 4 As the Supreme Court points out, the instant case seems to be the
first appellate case in this jurisdiction which deals directly with the question.5 It
is maintained therein that the denial of the defense of contributory negligence
is not an exception to the general rule that contributory negligence is a bar to
recovery in an action based upon the defendant's negligence, since willful, wanton and reckless misconduct is different, not only in degree but in kind from mere
negligence.
This difference in kinds of misconduct supports the proposition that the litigating parties are not in part delicto, for the misconduct of the parties is of two
distinct levels of moral and social culpability and the lesser misconduct cannot
be set off against the greater. Therefore, the plaintiff's contributory negligence
is no defense to an action predicated upon willful or wanton misconduct, contributory negligence being a defense only to an action founded upon negligence.
However, a determination of what constitutes "willful and wanton misconduct"
presents a difficult problem.
The distinction between intent and negligence is obvious. In ordinary
negligence the actor neither desires to bring about the harm which may follow
from his misconduct, nor is he conscious that it may occur. Thus, his misconduct
may be said to involve only an "unreasonable risk of harm."
However, the courts have gone further and recognized two distinct categories between the fields of negligent invasions and intentional wrongdoings.
One category is the wanton misconduct type of case. The second category involves
those wrongdoings wherein there is knowledge or realization on the part of the
actor that harm is "substantially certain" to follow. Moreover, the Restatement 6
and many courts-,though recognizing the distinction-have seen fit to label as
intentional that misconduct entered upon with realization of substantial certainty
of harm to another, leaving the wanton misconduct type of cast as the lone occupant of the space between negligent invasions and intentional wrongdoings.
In the field of intentional invasions it is well settled that the actor's liability
is not affected by any misconduct on the part of the other party; the protection
afforded the other party being absolute. What the actor has, in event the other
party exceeds a reasonable self-defense to the intentional invasion, is a right to
an independent action for damages; but this in no way affects the other's cause
of action. On the other hand, it is settled that the protection afforded from a
merely negligent invasion is much more limited. As pointed out earlier, liability
for negligent misconduct may be entirely abrogated by similar misconduct on the
part of the injured party when his misconduct contributes to the injury. How4

Restatement, Torts, § 482; and see Pa. Annot. to that section.
5348 Pa. 199,203 (1943).
GRestatement, Torts, § 13, comment d. See also Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts
(1941) §§ 30 and 38.
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ever, the protection afforded the injured party in the "in-between" category,
when the actor's misconduct has been reckless and wanton, must be more complete than he would receive if such misconduct were merely negligent. Thus,
it is reasonable to give protection from the actor's wanton misconduct even if the
other party sfiould contribute to the injury by misconduct of a "lesser kind," i.e.,
negligent misconduct. But where the other party's misconduct likewise can be
labelled "wanton," such protection should be taken away and the similar kinds of
misconduct set-off against each other. And the protection, where the actor has
acted recklessly or wantonly, should not be so great as to allow a recovery of
nominal damages, which is the absolute protection afforded in cases of intentional
invasions. Thus, the wanton misconduct category is truly "in-between," for the
protection which the injured party has is greater than he would have were the
actor's misconduct only negligent, but not so great as the protection he has when
the actor's misconduct is intentional.
What then is wanton misconduct? Subtle distinctions can be made between
"willful misconduct," "reckless misconduct" and "wanton misconduct," but in
practice the courts, looking to the maxim apices juris non sunt jura, have grouped
them together as an aggravated form of invasion, differing in quality rather than
in mere degree from ordinary lack of care. Such misconduct involves a mental
attitude of conscious indifference to consequences, the party guilty of such misconduct being aware that there is a high probability that harm will result. Thus,
wanton misconduct is positive in nature, while mere negligence is naturally
negative.
In view of the willingness to place wanton misconduct in the field of intentional wrongdoing, it would seem that a separate place must be made for this
type of case, omitting all reference to negligence. Such a criterion might be
referred to as "quasi-intentional misconduct," since the misconduct, though not
coupled with actual intent, is of a kind from which might be inferred an intent
7
to produce the injury.
Confusion with the doctrine of "last clear chance," which originally seems
8
to have been considered but a phase of the doctrine of proximate cause, has given
rise to much of the existing controversy over the rule allowing a plaintiff to recover in spite of his contributory negligence when the defendant has been guilty
of wanton misconduct. Under the last clear chance doctrine, even though the
plaintiff has exposed himself to peril by his own negligence, such contributory
negligence is insulated by the ability of the defendant to avoid the harm at the
7Look at UNIVERSAL CONCRETE Co. v. BAssErr, 130 Ohio St. 567. 200 N.E. 843.119 A.L.R.
where the court speaks of "the law of wanton misconduct." Also see the standard
"high degree of probability" in Restatement, Torts, § 500, which might apply to the suggested new
category.
8DAVIES V. MANN, 10 M. & W. 546 (1842).

646 (1936),
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last moment. However, a number of jurisdictions confine the doctrine to situations in which the defendant actually discovers the plaintiff's perilous condition
and thereafter fails to use reasonable care to avoid the accident. This is the
doctrine of "discovered peril," and presents a qualification under which the situation may well be that the defendant has been guilty of reckless and wanton misconduct; 9 although there has been much confusion in the application of the
doctrine.
In view of the emphatic rejection of the doctrine of last clear chance by the
Pennsylvania courts, 10 particular care must be employed in the choice of language,
if liability is to be imposed on a defendant guilty of wanton misconduct notwithstanding plaintiff's contributory negligence. Where the defendant has been
gulty of reckless and wanton misconduct, it is not negligence but some other kind
of culpable action which requires redress. And it is obvious that the cases will
be anomolous, if not contradictory, unless some definite standard is adopted for
reckless and wanton misconduct, for certainly wanton misconduct is not "a better term for wanton negligence.""
In the instant case, the appellant submits in his brief that a doctrine of comparative negligence is not being urged upon the court and points to the fact that
the definition of "negligence" is misconduct which involves acts wherein the
harmful consequences are not intended. In contrast, "recklessness" and "wantonness" is misconduct in which the actor has a conscious indifference to consequences. This is a more culpable kind of invasion, differing from mere negligent
misconduct both as to the quality of the act and the defenses thereto. In Pennsylvania the doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized, 12 except in
applying the federal statutes adopting the doctrine,' 8 the courts rigidly refusing to
balance or match degrees of negligence. However, comparative negligence deals
only with unintended consequences, i.e., in comparing the negligence of paintiff
and defendant for the purpose of awarding damages. 14 So, when the conscience
9

Under the discovered peril qualification of the last clear chance doctrine the defendant's misconduct, after discovering plaintiff's perilous condition, may amount to wanton misconduct. However, the doctrine also applies when defendant's misconduct has been merely negligent. What the
Pennsylvania courts must do is avoid the application of the discovered peril doctrine under the
guise of talking the language of wanton misconduct. See Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts
(1933), § 138.
101n ROSE v. QUAKER CITY CAB Co., 69 Pa. Super. 208 (1918) the rule is firmly established
and the earlier case of HESS v. KEMMERER, 65 Pa. Super. 247 (1916) is distinguished. In the
Hess Case the language of the court was a clear application of the last clear chance doctrine.
'iThe hiatus between negligence and willfulness is discussed in 45 C.J., p. 672-675. Professor
Lowndes says, in 22 Gen. L. J. 674,687 (1934): "Willful negligence seems to be a contradiction
of terms. From an ethical viewpoint recklessness falls somewhere between negligence and intentional misconduct, although legally it is more closely assimilated to intentional wrongdoing; but
recklessness
is neither willful nor negligent."
2
1 WEIR V. HAVERFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT Co., 221 Pa. 611, 617, 70 At. 874, 876 (1908).
13
FLYNN v. MOORE, 88 Pa. Super. 361, 364 (1926). This point is ably discussed in 17 Temp.
L. Q. 382
(1942).
4
1 Elliott,-in Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. Calif. L. Rev. 91,141 (1932), says: "The rule of corn,
parative negligence is a corollary of the doctrine that negligence is susceptible of division in

degrees."
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of the court is moved to aid a negligent plaintiff as againsr a defendant guilty,
of wanton misconduct, a careful distinction between negligent misconduct and
wanton misconduct will permit a finding not in conflict with the Pennsylvania
rejection of the doctrine of comparative negligence, viz., by application of a
rule of comparative fault, whereunder the court refuses to set up the lesser fault
against the greater.
It is negligent misconduct which is involved in application of the doctrines
of last clear chance and comparative negligence. Therefore, we are led to the
conclusion that the entire problem would be simplified by the adoption of a separate category for "wanton and reckless misconduct" so as to completely segregate
this type of misconduct from negligent misconduct.
J. S.

LOYND,

University of Pittsburgh Law School.

